Confirmed forward cargo door caused incidents/accidents:
UAL 811
PA 125
Probable forward cargo door caused accidents:
AI 182
PA 103
TWA 800
Possible forward cargo door caused accidents:
China Airlines
El Al Flight 1862
Two possible cargo door caused crashes, pending further investigation
are :
December 29, 1991, Boeing 747-2R7
China Airlines (Taiwan) Freighter, five on board, all killed.
Wanli; near (Taiwan)
Aircraft reported two starboard engines lost and crashed shortly after takeoff.
October 4, 1992, Boeing 747-258F
El Al (Israel) Four on board, all killed and 47 on the ground Amsterdam
(Netherlands)
Aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff.
The reasoning is that of the two above crashes, the sequence is closer to
the confirmed events of UAL 811 cargo
door, than to the confirmed events of JAL 46E fuse pin failure, yet
the offical probable cause of EL AL and
China Airlines is that of fuse pin failure.
The number three engine of above two Boeing 747s came off in flight,
it then took number four engine with it as it fell away. Both aircraft subsequently
crashed killing all aboard. The official cause was corroded fuse pins had
failed. The fuse pins hold the pylon which holds the engine to the wing.
The various permutations that two airplanes with four engines could have
with each having an engine falling off is sixteen, 1 and 1, 1 and 2, 1 and
3, 1 and 4, 2 and 1, 2 and 2, 2 and 3, 2 and 4, 3 and 1, 3 and 2, 3 and
3, 3 and 4, 4 and 1, 4 and 2, 4 and 3, and 4 and 4.
For fifteen of the above permutations a cargo door would not be considered,
for only one could the opening cargo door be considered as the underlying
cause, that is engine number 3 on one plane and engine number 3 on the other.
And it was both engines number three that failed, defying the random chances
of corroded fuse pins failing. In addition, the flight mode of climbing
(increasing internal air pressure,) is when most cargo door openings occur.
More confirming evidence is required but difficult to get from China or
Israel.
If a forward cargo door opened in flight but did not come off but allowed
some baggage to be sucked into the number three engine the engine would
vibrate and catch fire. The fuse pins would do as designed and fail, allowing
the dangerous engine and pylon to fall free. Unfortunately, the destructing
engine number three would eject metal into adjacent number four or spin
away and strike it causing that engine to fail and fall off also.
On the other three complete cargo door caused crashes of Boeing 747s, the
number three engine was fodded and detached from the wing early in the destruction
sequence. On the fourth cargo door caused accident, engines number three
and four were fodded so badly they vibrated and were about to fail when
they were shut down by the flight crew and remained attached.
When a sudden unexpected mechanical event occurs, certain mechanical events follow. There have been four confirmed instances where pylon fuse pins fail and the aircraft is there to be available for inspection. Certain sequences occurred when those fuse pins failed.
JAL, Evergreen, Air India, and NWA.
They occur during a stress event such as severe turbulence or hard landing.
In flight for JAL and Evergreen:
There is no fire or fire warning light and the pilot does not report
a fire.
The engine detaches, goes forward, flips up and back, taking wing leading
edge material with it affecting flap action but not affecting adjacent engine.
Pilot immediately reports engine lost when engine falls away. There is no delay between report of trouble and report of engine lost.
Things fall from the aircraft.
There have been two unconfirmed but official explanations of fuse pin failure for two Boeing 747 crashes. The mechanical sequence which occurs after the initial sudden unexpected mechanical event does not follow the confirmed sequence, but does follow the confirmed mechanical sequence when a forward cargo door opens in flight.
The two confirmed instances where the forward cargo door failed and the aircraft is available for inspection a certain sequence was followed.
PA 125 for the first item and UAL 811 for all.
They did not occur during a stress event such as severe turbulence or hard landing.
They occurred during climb shortly after takeoff.
There was a fire and a fire warning light on engine number 3.
There was a many second delay between fire in engine 3 and point of total engine failure.
The adjacent engine 4 is severely affected up to failure.
Flaps are affected.
Things fall from the aircraft.
Fire for engine number 3 was caused by objects from forward baggage hold after cargo door opened.
Engine number 4 object damage caused by baggage objects and debris from on fire failing engine number 3.
The two possible cargo door caused crashes, El Al 1862 and the Wanli China airlines, followed a mechanical sequence after the sudden unexpected event.
They did not occur during a stress event such as severe turbulence or hard landing.
They occurred during climb shortly after takeoff.
There was a fire and a fire warning light on engine number 3.
There was a many second delay between fire in engine 3 and point of total
engine failure.
The adjacent engine 4 was severely affected up to failure.
Flaps are affected.
Things fall from the aircraft.
The crash pattern for El Al and China Wanli fits the forward cargo door opening sequence better than the confirmed fuse failing, pylon and engine falling off sequence.
19:28:09 Crew: Affirmative, Mayday, Mayday, Mayday.
19:28:11 ATC: Turn right heading 260, field eh ...behind you eh...in your - to the west eh...distance 18 miles.
19:28:17 Crew: Roger, we have fire on engine number number 3, we have fire on engine number 3.
19:28:22 ATC: Roger, heading 270 for downwind.
19:28:24 Crew: 270 downwind.
19:28:31 ATC: (c/s) 1862, surface wind 040 at 21 knots.
19:28:35 Crew: Roger.
19:28:45 Crew: (c/s) 1862, lost number 3 and number 4 engine, number 4 and number 4 engine.
"Witnesses heard one or more banging sounds and saw a dark plume of smoke trailing the aircraft," the report said. "Some
witnesses saw objects fall. Other witnesses also saw fire on the right wing which eventually disappeared. When the aircraft turned
right, two vapour trails were seen to emerge from the wingtips."
The official report, excerpt below, misstates crew indicated a loss of thrust, they did not indicate a loss of thrust, they indicated they had fire and they indicated they later lost an engine but they did not indicate loss of thrust. Indicating loss of thrust is saying engine spooling down, or EPR dropping or some such, saying you have a fire does not indicate loss of thrust. And a pilot does not need unlimited field of view to realize he has lost 50000 pounds of weight off one side of his plane, his yoke will tell him.
From report:
"At 1928:17 hours, the crew reported a fire on Nr. 3 and subsequently they indicated [a] loss of thrust on engines Nr. 3 and Nr. 4," the report said. [The report attributed the flight crew's announcement of a fire on the Nr. 3 engine to a "double fault indication of the engine-fire logic, which triggered a fire warning, and the crew's limited field of view from the cockpit to the wing area.]"
So, which one is more credible? The experienced El Al pilot current in type who says fire twice? The corroborated eyewitnesses who make statements that make sense such as vapor trails which match fuel dumping, and a fire on right wing, not left, and goes out, not stays on until impact? Or a official report that says pilot was wrong, eyewitnesses are wrong, and never happened before double fault occurred?
Assume the pilot was correct and the crew reports corroborate the eyewitness report of fire on right wing. Can a fuse pin failing cause a fire and knock off adjacent engine? Maybe, never been done but possible. Fuse pin failing did not affect adjacent engine in confirmed fuse pin failures. Can a door opening and stuff pushed out and fodding engine causing fire in number 3 and affecting adjacent engine? Certainly, been done on confirmed accident.
If fuse pins goes, the engine does not dangle there for a while. It goes immediately.
If door opens and engine Fodded, it catches fire and continues to hang on to wing up to delayed destruction.
Reading the CVR for El Al as a fodded number 3, the sequence all fits with eyewitness corroboration, crew reports and destruction sequence which does things that have happened before.
For fuse pin the crew has to be wrong, the corroborated eyewitnessess have to be wrong, the destruction sequence has to do things that haven't happened before.
Note pilot was consistent. He said fire on three and lost 3 and four later on. He's not confused, like the tower. Crew was precise, repeating the important stuff. Between fire call and lost call were two other precise correct responses. To conclude crew did not know what exactly was happening to their plane is not right. To assume double fault with wiring to fit a pin explanation is not right.
To assume crew was correct, corroborated eyewitnesses, and previous similar accidents are correct is right.
More information is required to rule in or rule out forward cargo door opening in flight for El Al and China Wanli.
Boeing 747 EL AL Amsterdam crash
JAL46Econtents.html
Contents
Boeing 747-131
Trans World Airlines Flight 800
Debriefing
Boeing 747-237B
Air India Flight 182
Debriefing
Boeing 747-121A
Pan Am Flight 103
Debriefing
Boeing 747-122
United Airlines Flight 811
Debriefing
The Type Airplane
The Damage Starts
The Radar Blips
The Sudden Loud Sounds
The Abrupt Power Cuts
The Fodded Engines
The Inflight Damage
The Missing Bodies
The Torn Off Noses
The Wreckage Plots
More Similarities
The Red Herring: Bomb!
Inadvertent Opening of the Forward
Cargo Door in Flight
Forward Cargo Door Section
Introduction
Introduction Photograph
Introduction Page
Big picture
More pictures.
(larger picture with DC-10 door also)
Boeing 747.html
747historycontents.html
747-121dimensions.html
747cargo door and nose
747specsheet.html
747seating.html
747crashes.html
cargodoorfaraway.html
pressurization1.html
pressurization9.html
aerodynamics.html
crashchart0.html
crashchart1.html
Airworthiness Directive 79-17-02.html
Airworthiness Directive 88-12-04
Airworthiness Directive 90-09-06
800summary
variousdooraccidents.html
forwardcargodoorpict.html
Boeing 747 nose picts right side cargo door
cargodoorfaraway.html
Bibliography:
DC-10page146.html
DC-10page147.html
DC-10photorippeddoor.html
DC-10page148.html
DC-10page151.html
DC-10photowreckage.html
DC-10cargodoorcrashp15.html
DC-10crashcontents.html
AI182essentials.html
182summary.html
AirIndiareportcontents.html
125sum.html
PA103essentials.html
103radarblip1.html
103cvrtext1.html
103scancvr1.html
103scandraw0.html
103blipsani.html
103drawrightleftani.html
103reportcontents.html
UAL811essentials.html
811bigholephotobetter.html
811page92conclusions3cause.html
811PS.html
811picture
More pictures of UAL 811 cargo door hole
811reportcontentpage.html
811skiesdoorcontents.html
811page65uncommandeddoor.html
811page67uncommdooranly1.html
811page68uncommdoranly2.html 800streakexplained.html
800radarbipdoor.html
800cargodoor.html
ntsbcommentlatches.html
800avweekintrigue.html
TWA800essentials.html
800newsreports.html
800newsreports1.html
800newsreport2.html
800newsreport3.html
800crashsitemap.html
800wxradar.html
800partsphoto
800engine3.html
800publicappeal.html .
800doorversusfire.html
TBA.html
crashsimilarvariables.html
TWA800PA103UA811.html
747jetroutes.html
747contrails.html
ejection.html
314summary.html
314accidentreport.html